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Abstract—The optimization and simulation of power systems 
continues to be an area of concern for electricity companies and 
researchers worldwide namely considering the development of 
electricity markets and competition in the generation activity 
Therefore generation companies are devoting an increasing 
attention to market issues justifying the development of models 
to help them preparing bidding strategies to the day-ahead 
market. In this context, agent-based models have been reported 
as a complement to optimization and equilibrium models when 
the problem is too complex to be analyzed by traditional 
approaches. This paper details an Agent-Based Model for an  
electricity market considering a detailed modeling for hydro 
stations and presents some preliminary results taking the 
Iberian Electricity Market as an example. 
Index Terms--hydro stations, electricity markets, operation 
planning, agent-based models. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the scope of the development of electricity markets, the 
optimization of the operation of the hydro power plants has 
been regaining interest both among the research community 
and the electricity industry. This is certainly due to the change 
of paradigm determining the operation of power systems given 
the increased competition between market agents and the 
increase renewable energy share in power systems. In fact, 
hydro power plants have always been known for their large 
reliability and availability and also given their reduced 
response times. Currently, the existence of storage capabilities 
in an increasing number of hydro plants turns the management 
of these assets very important to the generation companies as a 
well to increase the overall revenues. On the other hand, the 
mentioned reduced response times turn hydro stations also 
very appealing as a very efficient way to provide reserve 
services so that they are becoming more and more important 
from the point of view of the TSO’s. Finally, their reduced 
response times combined with storage capability turn hydro 
stations as an important technology to help the management of 
power systems having a large share of renewable generation 
associated to volatile primary resources as wind and solar. 
Taking into account these concerns, it becomes important 
to develop new models so that generation companies can 
adequately plan the operation of hydro stations under 
competition. The role of modeling and simulation models to 
support decision-making in complex systems, as for example 
electricity markets, has been widely established as a valid 
technique. Recently, agent-based models were reported as a 
complement to equilibrium models when the problem is too 
complex to be analyzed by traditional models. Agent-based 
simulation follows the metaphor of autonomous agents and 
multi-agent systems as the basis to conceptualize complex 
systems. That is, a model is built taking advantage of the 
interaction between agents acting in a simulation environment. 
There are several approaches in the literature to the 
simulation of generation systems in market environment. 
However, the presence of a large share of hydro generation, 
specially pumping hydro, is not adequately treated [1]. 
Accordingly, this paper models the problem on an agent-based 
environment and presents results for the operation of an 
electricity market considering hydro stations and taking the 
Iberian Electricity Market, MIBEL as the illustrative example. 
We considered four types of hydro plants: run of river stations, 
storage stations, pumping storage stations and pure pumping 
stations. Hydro plants are modeled as agents that can produce 
and also consume (in the pumping case) meaning that they 
have to negotiate energy in the market as introduced in [2]. To 
support the hydro-pumping decisions different optimization 
models were already developed [3, 4] namely using nonlinear 
programming and Genetic Algorithms. 
Taking these ideas into account, this paper is structured as 
follows. After this introduction, Section II overviews the 
Iberian Electricity Market, given that the simulation of this 
market is the one of the goals of this research. Then, Section 
III gives an overview on existing approaches to deal with the 
hydro scheduling with particular emphasis on agent-based 
models. Section IV describes the proposed agent-based model 
and Section V details the results obtained so far. Finally 
Section VI draws the most relevant conclusions. 
II. ELECTRICITY MARKETS REVIEW 
A.  New Structures and the Unbundling Model 
To allow an appropriate development of electricity 
markets, significant changes were needed in power systems. In 
this context, electricity shall be regarded as a product traded in 
a competitive environment within certain rules. In this new 
framework, companies are seen as service providers and the 
grids correspond to the physical locations where electricity 
markets are established. On the other hand, in order to ensure 
that the whole system operates properly, independent entities, 
(both at a technical and at a regulatory level) are required. 
The electricity sector restructuring originated the 
unbundling of the traditional vertically integrated companies 
and the creation of a disaggregated structure involving 
activities covering the entire value chain, namely generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing. It also includes 
multiple actors as regulatory agencies, market and system 
operators, and several agents in the generation and retailing 
activities that are provided under competition. 
In general, generation and retailing are provided under 
competition while transmission and distribution grid activities 
are organized in regulated monopolies. In order to balance the 
demand and the supply new mechanisms have emerged, 
namely the day-ahead pool markets. The day-ahead markets 
that exist in several European countries correspond to short 
term forward markets based on the matching of the selling and 
buying bids for each hour of the next day. The market clearing 
prices are typically obtained under a marginal basis and are 
usually volatile, especially in countries where hydro and other 
renewable energies are present in large scale (as in MIBEL). 
In order to be aware of this volatility, longer term contracts are 
also possible under different horizons and conditions. 
B. The Iberian Electricity Market, MIBEL  
Portugal and Spain power systems went through several 
changes in last decades. In Portugal, the power industry was 
nationalized in the 1970s with the creation of a vertically 
integrated utility. This organization started to change in 1995 
when a new electricity law was passed admitting the 
coexistence of a public and a market driven sector. Later, in 
2006 a new electricity law was passed organizing the industry 
in generation, transmission, distribution and retailing. The 
Regulatory Agency was created in 1995 and is responsible for 
the publication of several codes and for setting the regulated 
tariffs. Since 2007, all clients are eligible and the free market 
represented 73% of the demand by the end of 2013.  
In Spain the power system was also organized in terms of 
vertically integrated utilities having a regional distribution. 
Then a new law was also passed in 1995 in a first attempt to 
introduce some competitive mechanism in the system. Later 
on, by the end of 1997 a new law was approved so that the 
Spanish electricity day-ahead market was in place in the 1st of 
January 1998. Since then, a fast transition of regulated captive 
clients to the free market was implemented so that full 
eligibility was achieved in 2003. 
The implementation of MIBEL started with the signature 
of a memorandum by the Portuguese and Spanish 
governments in 2001. After several delays, a common bilateral 
contract trading mechanism was set in place in 2006 and the 
joint day-ahead market started in the 1st of July 2007 as an 
extension of the already existing Spanish day-ahead market. In 
the first operation years the electricity prices in the two areas 
were different in a large number of hours due to the 
application of market splitting to solve congestion in the 
interconnections. Nowadays, due to the increase of the 
interconnection capacity and the increasing share of 
generation in distribution networks, transmission grids are less 
loaded so that the number of congested hours declined. As a 
result the prices in the two countries converged to common 
values in almost 85% of the hours in 2013 and 2014. 
Regarding the generation mix, both countries have a large 
share of hydro plants with a huge variation in their annual 
output. In terms of the renewable share, both countries were 
very successful in increasing the amount of renewables. This 
corresponded to a strategic policy adopted by successive 
governments to use more intensively endogenous resources, to 
enlarge the energetic independency and also to develop new 
industrial activities thus creating new jobs. By the end of 
2014, wind power reached an installed capacity of 5270 MW 
out of 17827 MW in Portugal (30%) and of 22854 MW out of 
102259 MW in Spain (22 %) with a contribution to supply the 
demand of 25% in Portugal and 21% in Spain. 
III. LITERATURE REVIEW ON HYDRO SCHEDULING 
A. Hydro Scheduling Optimization 
Generation companies having hydro power plants in their 
portfolio have to identify the most adequate operation strategy 
in order to maximize their profit. In a competitive 
environment, they have to build selling bids (and buying when 
they have pumping) and send them to the day-ahead market 
operator. In addition to the uncertainty associated to the hydro 
conditions, the optimization of hydro power plants is a 
complex and nonlinear problem namely due to the nonlinear 
relation between the power, the flow and net head. The 
literature includes a large number of publications on this topic. 
In this scope, [5] uses dynamic programming but this 
technique usually leads to the well-known “curse of 
dimensionality”. Other publications use mixed integer linear 
programming [6] or meta-heuristics, as Simulated Annealing 
[7], Neural Networks [8] or Genetic Algorithms [4]. The 
mentioned nonlinear relation can also be addressed using an 
iterative procedure as described in [3]. 
B. Electricity Markets Modeling 
There are several works that were developed to model 
electricity markets using different techniques that can be 
organized in four main areas [9]: 
• Optimization problems, addressing a single company 
also known as single firm optimization models; 
• Equilibrium Models based on Game Theory, 
considering a larger number of competitors; 
• Agent-Based Models, ABM, that simulate the behavior 
of the companies and the interactions between agents; 
• Hybrid solutions. 
Optimization models typically address the maximization 
of the revenues of a single company, often considered as a 
price taker. Some examples were described in section III-A. 
Equilibrium Models represent the market behavior 
considering the competition between all participants. More 
recently, Agent-Based Models became an interesting 
alternative when the complex level prevents using traditional 
equilibrium framework. Agent-based computational 
economics (ACE) corresponds to the computational study of 
economic dynamic systems modelled as virtual worlds of 
interacting autonomous agents in an environment. 
C. Agent-Based Models in Electricity Markets 
There are several models in the literature addressing this 
issue as AMES (Agent-based Modeling of Electricity 
Systems), EMCAS (Electricity Market Complex Adaptive 
Systems) and MASCEM (Multi Agent based Electricity 
Market). AMES is an open source platform that allows the 
simulation of strategic trading behaviors in restructured 
markets considering AC grids [10]. EMCAS is a commercial 
ABM software developed by the Argone National Lab having 
the capability of taking decentralized decision-making along 
with learning and adaptation for agents. An EMCAS 
simulation includes both the end users and the demand 
companies from whom they purchase electricity. EMCAS is 
linked to VALORAGUA model [11] that provides longer term 
operation planning strategies for hydro plants. With this 
information, EMCAS uses the price forecasts and weekly 
hydro schedules given by VALORAGUA to provide intra-
week hydro plant optimization for hourly supply offers. 
Finally, the MASCEM is a simulation platform based on a 
multi-agent framework [12]. It includes agents with strategies 
for bid definition, acting in forward, day-ahead, and balancing 
markets and considering both simple and complex bids turning 
it both in a short and a medium term model. 
Nevertheless, hydro generation, specially pumping hydro 
stations, is not adequately characterized taking into account 
the increase of renewable volatile sources. For instance, 
EMCAS includes the VALORAGUA model turning it very 
dependent on the performance of the VALORAGUA. This 
also means that EMCAS does not include the definition of 
bidding strategies to hydro power plants. Taking this into 
account, the main objective of this research is to simulate 
hydro generation in a market environment using an ABM 
platform, especially regarding hydro with pumping given the 
extra flexibility these stations have in terms of buying 
electricity in off peak hours when eventually extra wind 
generation is available and selling it in peak hours. This will 
allow us to study their impact on systems having a large 
penetration of renewable sources, especially wind. 
IV. DEVELOPED AGENT-BASED MODEL  
As mentioned before the main goal of this paper is to 
present a model for hydro plants agents in an Agent-Based 
framework, based on the model introduced in [1] and in [2]. 
A. Hydro Agents 
Hydro station agents bid their energy in the market and 
their strategy is very dependent on the type of reservoir and 
inflows. Depending on the hydro type, the bidding price 
strategy is determined by the water value on the reservoir, by 
a learning parameter α and by a decision supporting tool, all 
of them originally described in [2] and modeled as (1). In a 
first approach, this bid price has the same value for every 
hour of the next day, except for pure pumping plants. The 
water value function f(water value) provides each plant with a 
reference bid price that changes every day depending on the 
reservoir level, as illustrated in Figure 1. This means that if 
the level is larger, then the value of the water stored is more 
reduced and so a more reduced biding price can also be used. 
This water value function is calculated for each weak 
according to the procedure detailed in [2]. 
Bid price strategy = f(water value)+bid up/down (α) (1) 
 
Figure 1. Base bidding taking into account the water value. 
The bid up/down (α) parameter models the strategy of 
each agent by increasing or decreasing its bid price as a way 
to increase the profit. This parameter is given by a learning 
procedure modeled using a sigmoid function that reflects the 
risk profile of each agent. If an agent has a higher risk profile, 
the bid range will be larger. On the other hand, a low risk 
profile will lead to a lower bid range as illustrated in Figure 2 
for hydro agents having different risk profiles. This strategy 
is an adaptation of the derivative-following strategy discussed 
in [13] and also used in [12]. A derivative follower does 
incremental increases (or decreases) in price, continuing to 
move its price in the same direction until the observed 
profitability level falls. At this point, the direction of the 
movement is reversed. In future works, this strategy will be 
combined will a Q-learning procedure. 
 
Figure 2. Bidding strategy taking into account the risk profile of each agent. 
The developed ABM model 4 considers four types of 
hydro agents having different bidding strategies:  
• Run of river – these agents typically have a water value 
function near 0, so they will have more focus on their 
bid up/down strategy; 
• Storage – these agents will have a bid value directed 
related to their water value function as well as to their 
bid up/down strategy; 
• Storage with pumping – the bid price is linked to their 
water value function and a bid up/down strategy. They 
also have the possibility of buying energy to pump 
water to their reservoir, taking advantage of low prices; 
• Pure pumping – these agents are assigned a zero water 
value because these reservoirs are usually small. They 
will use decision support tools to forecast the day-
ahead electricity prices so that they can define an 
arbitrage strategy based on price differential between 
peak and off peak hours. Given that forecasted and real 
market prices can differ, the energy used in pumping is 
limited by a parameter β. This parameter is updated 
Max bid up 
Max bid down Strategy 
Max bid up 
Max bid down 
Strategy 
bid 
Reservoir Max Min 
along the simulation and it reflects the relation between 
the forecasted prices and the real market prices. When 
an agent decides to pump, it has an expectation for the 
next day market prices. But in real time there is a risk 
that on generation periods the real price is below the 
expected one and on pumping periods the real price is 
above the expected one turning pumping less 
profitable. Therefore, this parameter is updated to 
address this risk using a learning procedure. 
B. Thermal and Renewable Generation Agents 
These agents have a strategy similar to the hydro agents, 
but the water value function is substituted by their marginal 
cost. Renewable agents bid at 0 €/MWh in order to model 
their dispatch priority according to the Portuguese legislation.  
C. Market and System Operator Agents 
The Market Operator agent is an artifact agent, given that 
it has not an associated decision making process [1]. It 
performs the market clearing operations determining the 
market price and communicating the market results to all 
market agents. Regarding the System Operator, in this phase 
this agent is not used. In future developments, it will manage 
the ancillary service markets, namely to determine the amount 
of secondary and tertiary reserve to procure and contract. 
D. Inelastica and Elastic Consumer Agents 
These include two types of agents: inelastic agents that 
buy energy at the maximum value allowed in the MIBEL rules 
(180 €/MWh), and elastic agents that are designed to model 
the behaviour of consumers that can directly participate in the 
market, typically large industries or hydro pumping stations. 
Elastic consumers will be responsible for some demand 
response regarding price variations in their buying curves. 
E. Regulater Agent 
This agent monitors the generator bids and can penalize 
these agents if the bid prices are very different of the marginal 
cost regarding thermal stations or of the water value for hydro 
stations. It also has the possibility of imposing a limit to the 
bidding prices so that they adhere more closely to the marginal 
cost of thermal stations or to the water value of hydro stations. 
V. PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
The test case was based on a simplified version of the 
Portuguese generation system, to allow a better analysis of the 
results. We considered 22 hydro power plants having constant 
inflows and 11 thermal (coal and natural gas) units. The 
generation mix also includes 5 reservoir pumping plants. In a 
first step, wind and PV units were set constant for all hours at 
2000 MW. Then we used the 2013 historical generation 
profile for these units. The demand is assumed totally inelastic 
and prepared to pay the maximum price admitted in MIBEL, 
180 €/MWh. Initially, the demand has a daily constant profile 
and then we used the 2013 demand data. 
A. Generation companies without strategies 
The first simulation assumes that generation companies 
bid without any special strategy, that is, their bids simply 
reflect the operation marginal cost of each station. On the 
other hand constant profiles were used for the demand and for 
the wind and PV units. Figure 3 shows the market price results 
if the generators bid their variable cost. The off peak prices are 
determined by run of river hydro and coal plants, while the 
peak prices result from bids from natural gas and reservoir 
plans. In this simulation we did not consider the possibility of 
pumping neither the monitoring action of the regulator. 
 
Figure 3. Market price results for simulation 1. 
B. Generation companies with strategies 
In the second simulation we considered that all generators 
have an higher risk profile which means that they will do 
aggressive bids up and down (for example all increasing or 
decreasing the bids by 1 €/MWh in each iteration). Figure 4 
shows the market price results. Although there is no 
communication between generators, after same time all of 
them start biding close to 180 €/MWh, which is the maximum 
price the demand is prepared to pay. Given that the demand is 
completely inelastic, they rapidly realize that if they all bid the 
maximum price they will maximize their profits.  
 
Figure 4. Market prices results for simulation 1. 
However, in real markets this doesn’t happen because not 
all generators behave in the same way and there is a regulator 
to monitor and eventually penalize them. Figure 5 presents 
the results admitting that the Regulator Agent limits the bids 
by 20% of the generators marginal cost, as well as the results 
considering that generators have different risk profiles so that 
they can change they bid price along the simulation. If the bid 
prices is limited (blue line), the market prices are more stable. 
However, we are introducing an artificial limit in the 
simulation that has an impact in competition. The red line 
represents the results considering that the regulator doesn’t 
limit the bid prices but generators have different bid 
strategies, that is different risk profiles. The results show that 
competition is now working and prices are very similar to the 
ones obtained considering the regulator limitation. In this 
case, a consecutive bid up made by a risky generator trying to 
maximize the profit may not be successful because the other 
generators have different risk profiles and do not follow the 
same strategy. For this reason, in our work we will consider 
that generators have different risk profiles and the regulator 
will not limit the bids, but instead it will check if the bids are 
excessively higher regarding the marginal cost. If that 
happens, the profit of the associated agents is penalized. 
 Figure 5. Market prices results for different risk profiles. 
C. Using the 2013 renewable and demand profiles 
The use of the real wind, PV and demand profiles for 2013 
turns this simulation closer to reality. Initially we ran a 
simulation using these profiles, and then the number of natural 
gas plants was increased to foster competition. Figure 6 
presents the results obtained for these two simulations. 
 
Figure 6. Market prices results for 2013 wind and demand profile. 
As expected the markets prices are higher when wind 
energy is more reduced. In fact on the right side of Figure 6, 
wind energy is more reduced and market prices are close to 90 
€/MWh when the higher marginal operation cost is 75 
€/MWh. In blue we can also observe the impact of having 
more competition on peak periods due to more natural gas 
power plants and leading to peak price reductions. Table 1 has 
the annual average market prices for these simulations. 
Table 1. Average market prices using the 2013 profiles. 
Simulation with 2013 wind, PV 
and demand profiles 
Average annual Market 
Price (€/MWh) 
Bid at the marginal operation cost 41.22 
All Generators with higher risk 171.08 
Generators with different risk profiles 47.02 
More natural gas units 45.13 
D. Comparison results without pumping hydros 
Finally, we analyzed a period having a large amount of 
wind energy with and without pumping stations. The results 
in Figure 7 show that if pumping is included, then zero price 
periods are more reduced suggesting that pumping hydro 
plants are able to do price arbitrage and to behave as price 
makers. This means they have to consider the difference 
between forecasted and real prices as a way to minimize their 
risk. In this case, this risk was modeled as detailed in [5]. 
 
 
Figure 7. Impact in market prices of having pumping hydro. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper presents the preliminary results of an ABM 
model to simulate the electricity market focusing on modeling 
hydro units. The obtained results confirm the agents have 
learning capabilities and are maximizing their profit. We also 
observe the importance of regulation in this kind of markets 
and that competition is able to decrease the market prices 
namely when considering more CCGT’s. On the other hand, 
having an accurate model for hydro pumping units is very 
important in the Portuguese case because these units often 
behave as price makers. In future works, this model will be 
extended to include the Spanish generation system and a Q-
learning process to improve the learning capabilities of the 
generation agents. Finally, the model will be completed 
including ancillary services markets namely for reserves. 
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